In the literature on political parties, organizational changes are often discussed in terms of predestined developments towards a particular party type -analytically presented as a 'model' -around which existing parties eventually will converge. The argument is that democratic polities offer a standardized setting, a common arena on which all parties fight for votes and power. This arena is made up by social parameters, institutional context and technological instruments that all parties have to face, forcing them to become more alike if they want to survive, to keep their voters and to stay in power. Regardless of party traditions they adopt elements from the 'mass party', the 'catch-all' party or the 'cartel' party models according to the external forces defining their operative surroundings.
However, even though party convergence recurs in the literature party heterogeneity prevails in the actual party world. This is also reflected in the literature but of course in other works. Some theories inspired by economists stress the homogenizing political 'pull' of 'the centre' although the same fellows -the economists that is -argues the need for 'product differentiation'. Clearly -as both the 'determinists' and the 'voluntarists' are well aware of -these positions are not intrinsically antithetical. Parties may become more alike politically and in certain practices while still remaining different as organizational types. Old Leninist parties may adopt modern communication techniques while remaining Leninist, and mass parties may hire more experts in media handling while remaining mass parties. In other words: Parties may change in the same direction but within different modes.
There is clearly a need both for singular 'models' and plural 'typologies'.
In this paper we will discuss the organization of the main political parties in Norway. We look for signs of stability and change, and our empirical focus includes both actual changes in organizational structure and party debates about such change.
The research questions are; first, whether we can find proof of such change; second, whether the debates show a common trans-party understanding of the need and direction of organizational change and; third, whether these facts jointly indicate an increased homogeneity in the way Norwegian political parties operate in practice. In mapping developments in party organization we shall first discuss recent historical trends, i.e. till the mid-1990s. Then we focus on current debates and changes in three aspects of organizational structure: The organization and activities of party members, the decision-making mechanisms and, thirdly, the internal party lines of communications. Our presentation is based on interviews with general secretaries or organization directors from the seven major Norwegian parties, as well as various party documents. 1 In conclusion we return to the question of organizational trends and their likely causes in Norwegian parties. We start, however, with sorting out some analytical issues.
TOWARDS NETWORK PARTIES?
The mass party was -according to Duverger (1954) -the most effective votecatching political machine in industrial society. The old 'caucus' parties learned and copied from the rising socialist movement on the left. In the emerging media society of the 1960s the party 'contagion' came from the right: The catch-all party wasaccording to Kirchheimer (1966) -the organizational mode best suited for the new age of television and declining political loyalties. Epstein (1967) pointed to the American version of the 'best practice' party mode when he stressed the electoral advantage of the leadership based campaign organizations. More recently Katz and Mair (1995) have suggested that times have come for the cartel party model as a product of a new party-state relationship, in particular based on public finances.
What these authors have in common is an assumption that external forces are guiding the parties towards a similar organizational mode. An alternative approach is found in the institutional and historical focus of Panebianco (1988) . He places a stronger emphasis on internal agency and organizational origin when searching for a party typology. In Panebianco's world genesis and internal, dominant coalitions are the keys to understanding how today's parties operates. There is more than one 'party model' option for party change.
In the following we shall try to balance the pluralism of party types and the assertion of a trend towards a single, unified model. Today the tendency in our view is towards parties that are loosening their formal organizational structure; they have 'opened up' in the direction of less strict boundaries between internal and external processes. We stress both internal agency and external arena in The main tension within the network parties is between internal party democracy and the party elite with its professional staff acting on the media-driven public arena.
Politically the party elite will adapt quickly to a transient and turbulent external market while at the same time anchoring its policies in party manifestos. Or at least work to convince the party faithful that this is what they are doing under challenging circumstances.
In empirical terms, this is what we will be looking for in this paper: Different as today's Norwegian parties no doubt still are, can we find a common understanding of challenges and remedies in party debates on organizational change? Can we find a common trend in practical organizational engineering among these parties? We will, however, concentrate on the elements of the network party model that involve the relationship between the parties and their members: the continued importance of party members (3), the continued importance of the organization (5) , and the rise of informal networks (6) . Other developments in party organizations, such as the expansion and professionalization of the party bureaucracy or the development of new campaign techniques, receive less attention.
A note on change and innovation, structure and practice
Organizational change is the difference found between two points in time in the way a party operates. Organizational innovation is the part of that change which is intentionally brought about by some agents inside the party. Decline in party membership is organizational change while the introduction of internet-based party branches would be innovation. The emphasis of this paper will be on innovation although the dividing line is sometimes hazy and -for our purpose here -not crucial.
In this perspective, the rapid decline in party membership is not necessarily relevant to the discussion of party models. As Duverger (1954:63) pointed out, the distinction between mass and cadre parties 'is not one of size but of structure'. Mass parties can lose members but maintain their mass party structure and practices. However, innovation will sometimes be triggered by other kinds of change. For example, decline in branch level activities forces the party leadership to innovate in order to keep useful lines of communications with the members, the activists and the devoted party supporters.
We may distinguish between two dimensions of organizational innovation:
changes in formal structures -like changes of the party rules -and actual practices.
Party models measure organizational change by a mix of indicators derived in part from formal organizational structure and in part from other organizational processes.
The Duverger approach emphasises structural characteristics like direct organization or indirect confederate types and the basic elements of organizational structure (caucus, branch cell, militia (Svåsand et al. 1997:118) .
Experiments with alternative party models have been carried out, but these innovations were rather short-lived. In other words, Duverger's 'contagion from the Left' has been effective up until the late 1990s.
Normalization of alternative models
The two new parties of the 1970s -the Socialist Left Party and the Progress Party -were both examples of innovative organizational models. 2 The Socialist Left
Party represented a 'grass-roots model', like many European Green parties. The organization was designed for power-sharing, as opposed to the more hierarchical models of both the Labour Party and the Communists. Accordingly, the party practised office rotation: individuals could not serve in the same office for more than four years. Moreover, the parliamentary group had only a limited number of seats in the national executive committee -to prevent a 'parliamentarization' of the extraparliamentary organization. These features were dropped during the 'normalization' of the 1980s. The rotation system underestimated the difficulties of finding able and willing candidates. And since the parliament is the country's central political arena, the separation of the parliamentary party group and extra-parliamentary organization actually put the executive committee on the sideline (Svåsand 1994a; 1994b) .
One innovation of the 'grass-roots model', however, became both permanent and contagious. The Liberal Party and the Socialist Left Party were the first Norwegian parties to adopt gender quotas, which required party conventions and committees to have at least 40 per cent of each gender (Inhetveen 1999) . Gender quotas were later adopted also by Labour, the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats.
The Progress Party, on the other hand, was initially designed as a 'charismatic party'. The party founder, Anders Lange, detested the established 'particracy' and its formal, bureaucratic organizations. He preferred a loose movement, and created an anti-party party focused on his own personality and political message (Harmel and Svåsand 1993; Bjørklund 2000) . However, Lange died in 1974, just a year after his party's birth. Carl I. Hagen was elected party leader three years later -a post which he still occupies. His pro-organizational orientation was radically different from Lange's views, and a 'normal' organization was created.
During the late 1980s, the Progress Party enjoyed electoral success. A large number of party members were elected to local public offices, and many new local branches were founded. As the party's anti-establishment ideology tended to attract staunch individualists, the need for party discipline was apparent. The party's organizational plans from this period reflect a continued 'contagion from the left'. The goal was to build a 'Progress Movement'; a strong organization with a well-developed network, inspired by the labour movement. A 'Superiority Principle' was introduced:
the extra-parliamentary organization should be superior to party representatives in public offices, at both the national and the local level. 3 The executive committee stressed the need for party unity. County and municipal branches were described as 'subdivisions', subject to the executive committee's control and supervision -just like the branches of a company, which are controlled by the board. 4 In other words, the party had gone a long way from the charismatic founder's anti-party approach.
The culmination of the mass party
Two developments in the 'model party' itself -the Labour Party -deserve to be mentioned. First, the 1992 party congress decided to abolish the practice of Second, we may regard the introduction of 'management by objectives'
(MBO) in the Labour Party as the culmination of mass party structure and practices in
Norway. This management philosophy spread from the private sector to governmental institutions during the 1980s. During the early 1990s, MBO was adopted by the Labour Party, and -in a much less ambitious way -by the Centre Party (Heidar and Saglie 1994; Myking 1997) .
Through MBO, the whole organization of the Labour Party should concentrate on selected objectives. The national council gave priority to three political and three organizational areas, on the basis of broad discussions in local branches. A 'Strategic
Plan' outlined goals, sub-goals and measurable indicators within these selected fields.
Local and county branches were to make and implement their own local plans, within the framework of the national plan. The whole process should be repeated every year.
To repeat the procedure, however, created problems. On the one hand, the party could not just discard the prioritized fields (such as employment or children), and select completely new priorities. A party cannot change its priorities every year. It was, on the other hand, difficult to activate the grass roots in the continued planning process unless some renewal of the priorities took place. And if the number of prioritized areas increased, the prioritization would lose its effect. Therefore, the party gave up the MBO concept. 5 It might have been difficult to continue the MBO, even without these problems. In theory, the making of the 'Strategic Plan' should be a bottom-up process, with local activity as its starting point. In practice, it was driven forward by the party's central office, while the grass roots were far less enthusiastic. Furthermore, the emphasis on plans, forms, and measurable indicators made the project rather bureaucratic. The MBO concept thus collided with the new discourse on societal changes. A few years later, Labour's leader Thorbjørn Jagland (1999) claimed that the old-fashioned organizational pyramids were crumbling in the new information society. Individualization, decentralization and flat structures were required. (Heidar 1994; Lesjø 2000) . Passive members have of course always existed, also in the presumed 'golden age' of party politics. There are good reasons to be sceptical about the 'myth of the blighted present' (Scarrow 1996) . Nevertheless, the combination of declining membership and widespread passivity worries the party organizers. Very few people actually participate in the parties' policy and personnel decisions. This is perceived as a threat to the legitimacy of the parties and their policies. For example, the Socialist Left Party declared that 'we do not want the political parties to be reserved for a microscopic group of people, but to engage and challenge most people' (SV 2000) . The party therefore started a 'project for visionary organizational development', in order to develop alternative party models.
The party elites appear to agree on the diagnosis: they regard an individualization of political and social preferences as the reason for their enrolment losses. Political participation has become more fragmented. Party loyalty disappears.
People prefer single-issue participation to the 'package deals' that political parties represent. In addition, citizens have less spare time to devote to political activity.
During our interviews, such arguments were mentioned in almost all parties. This view is also stated by leading party politicians, such as the former Socialist Left Party leader Erik Solheim (1999:426-36 ) and Labour's leader Thorbjørn Jagland (1999) .
The parties also blame themselves. The Centre Party stated that 'many citizens feel that the parties are isolating themselves from the people, instead of being a tool for the people. We are on our way to a rigid and firmly cemented party apparatus, which has little contact with the people' (Senterpartiet 1996) . Similar diagnoses are found in most parties.
The Progress Party is an exception, for obvious reasons. First, the party's membership has increased during the late 1990s. Thus, innovations are not required to attract new members. Second, the Progress Party has gone through bitter factional and personal conflicts, which has led to suspension and exclusion of some members.
Moreover, the party has adopted an office-seeking strategy. 6 The party wants to be included in a government coalition, and needs to keep a unitary and 'responsible'
profile. To the Progress Party leadership, lack of party discipline is apparently more worrying than membership apathy. The Progress Party's unique problems have resulted in unique innovations. One example is an 'organizational culture committee'
which is established to handle internal conflicts. Another example is the concept of 'resignation by action'. If a member tries to harm the party in public (e.g. by strongly attacking the party or its elected leaders), this action may be regarded as a resignation from the party, and his/her membership is terminated without a formal exclusion procedure. 7 Most parties carry out recruitment campaigns, but they are rarely successful.
For example, a Liberal Party report states that the declared 'winners' of such campaigns often turned out not to be real winners, because many of the newly recruited members never actually paid their membership fee (Venstre 2000:22) . The parties therefore want to make membership more attractive. We shall discuss two ways to increase attractivity: thematic structures and inclusiveness.
Thematic networks
Modern citizens must be offered something more exciting than branch meetings, according to the party organizers. Many resourceful members are not given the opportunity to participate in activities within their own field of interest.
Commitment to an issue (e.g. the EU issue) brings members into the party. These issue activists are hardly satisfied with debates on municipal affairs (such as the construction of local roads and sewerage systems). Even worse: party branches may not discuss politics at all -only organizational matters. Politics is left to the party group in the municipal council. This is a problem for the party -which needs knowledgeable people as policy developers -as well as the individual member. To quote the Liberal Party report: the party needs a 'better management of human capital' (Venstre 2000:11) . A proposed solution is to develop a thematic network structure, which cross-cuts the traditional geographic structure. However, the interest in thematic branches and networks varies between the parties. The Centre Party, for instance, underlines the value of its geographical branches. This is partly because the party already has a very well-developed network of local branches, especially in rural areas. 10 In addition, the Centre Party's approach to party activity may be described as communitarian, with a strong emphasis on community politics.
Virtual branches (i.e. branches that meet on the internet) are also discussed, but no such branches have yet been created. In a document from the Socialist Left Party's organization project, internet branches are described as especially useful for those who live in small municipalities, without enough members to start a geographical branch (SV 2000) . The Labour Party introduced virtual branches in its statutes at the 2000 congress. However, these statutes illustrate a potential problem with virtual branches: the collision between the faceless anonymity of the internet and the face-to-face contact of the mass party. At annual meetings and meetings with elections to party offices, the virtual branch 'must carry out these meetings in such a way that those who participate in debates and votes are present in the same room, when the debates and votes take place'. ordinary voters: the 'registered sympathizers'. 13 These registered sympathizers will be connected to the party through various issue-based information networks.
Sympathizers will receive information about party policy on selected issues, and they will be given the opportunity to pass on their opinions to the party. Membership fees are not required. Such information networks (based on e-mail) have been tried out in the party's Oslo branch. 14 Similar ideas are discussed in the Socialist Left Party.
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Nevertheless, there are clear limits to inclusiveness. The parties want the ideas, opinions and expertise of non-members, but they are not included in formal decisionmaking processes. This is clearly stated, for example, in a Liberal party report. On the one hand, it is argued that people should be free to participate in party activity, without joining the party as a member. On the other hand, only members should have the right to vote when the party makes its policy and personnel decisions. Nonmembers may propose candidates for public offices, and even run for office at party lists, but not participate in the selection (Venstre 2000:19) . A similar demarcation is made in the new statutes for Conservative Party branches. In addition, these statutes declare that registered sympathizers are not eligible for party offices. 16 Most parties draw such clear limits to inclusiveness. The reason is obvious: the whole idea of party membership (and a membership party) rests on a set of privileges and obligations (Scarrow 1996:16-21) . Would anybody join a party that only imposed obligations on its members (such as paying membership fees), without any exclusive privileges?
Decision-making mechanisms
The principle of delegatory democracy has been a central feature of Norwegian party organizations. Members participate by attending branch meetings.
From the local units, delegates are mandated to congresses at the county level. The 19 county branches elect most of the delegates to the national congress, which officially is the highest organ of the party. The problem with this chain of command is the distance between the individual member and the actual decisions. Some party organizers regard delegatory democracy as unsuitable in the age of individualization.
The Labour Party's leader Thorbjørn Jagland (1999), for example, described the situation in this way:
The parties must take into account that people, in their daily life, feel that they are taken much more seriously than before, and they are allowed to use their abilities and knowledge immediately. This is lost in the delegatory democracy of the parties, where branches elect representatives to higher organs, which speak and make decisions on behalf of all members. The way from the individual member to the decision-making organs often becomes too long. Much of public opinion is lost on the way. And people lose their interest in participation.
In short, direct democracy may be another way of making party membership more attractive -in addition to those mentioned earlier. The following section concentrates on three kinds of direct intra-party democracy: membership ballots, changes in candidate selection, and preferential voting.
Membership ballots
Membership ballots on policy and personnel questions have been introduced Consequently, an economic disincentive to innovation will disappear if the commission's recommendations are adopted by the Parliament.
Preferential voting
Some aspects of the electoral system have profound effects on the distribution of power within the party. As Gallagher (1988) own ranking of their candidates will therefore still be important. It is nevertheless a paradox that party organizers emphasize that candidate selection is an exclusive right for members, while they intend to let the voters in through the 'back door' of preferential voting.
Internal party lines of communications
Intra-party democracy is time-consuming -and time is a scarce resource for party leaders today. The mass media demand quick answers to a wide range of questions. The technological development adds to the demand for rapid response.
There is not enough time to consult the members -while other political actors, such as lobbyists and interest groups, manage to get their message through to the party leaders. Furthermore, members themselves often require quick answers from their leaders, instead of waiting for the proper democratic procedures. Consequently, the party organization has become a 'dead-end street' to political influence -according to a Liberal Party report (Venstre 2000:16) .
No party has found any easy organizational solution to this dilemma, but new communication technology creates possibilities as well as problems. In particular, the parties have learnt to use the internet. In this section we discuss how the parties use the internet to improve external and internal communication. Another question is whether and how a traditional channel of communication -the parties' internal newspapers -survive in the internet era.
Internet
Some Norwegian parties have done more to utilize the internet than others.
Parties with many young and well-educated members and activists tend to be in the forefront. Some general developments have, however, taken place in all parties during the 1990s. All parties use the internet for communication with the general public as well as internal communication.
All parties have developed websites, where they present news and information about their party and current political issues. 26 In some parties, people can subscribe to e-mail newsletters from the party leaders. This way, the party elites are able to present an unfiltered party message to members and voters -not distorted by hostile and sensationalist journalists. The traditional party press has been depoliticized, but a modern version of the loyal party press has reappeared at the internet.
The websites also facilitate two-way communication. Many voters and members send e-mail to the parties -and thus increase the workload at the central office, if the letters are to be answered. In principle, this is nothing new. People have always written letters to politicians. But to some groups, e-mail may lower the threshold for contact. In addition to e-mail contact, most parties have an open discussion forum on their websites. However, the easy access and the anonymity of the internet sometimes create problems. For example, the Progress Party discovered that various extremist groups abused its discussion forum. Right-wing extremists used the forum to discuss racist ideas, whereas left-wing extremists used it to accuse the party of Nazism. Understandably, the party chose to close down its open forum. contributions to the internal debate, party elites may recruit them to central positions directly -bypassing the branch structure.
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In principle, the most important step towards decreasing mediation was the development of centralized and computerized membership archives. This process was completed in all Norwegian parties by the early 1990s. When these registers were established, party leaders could send mail directly to all their members. In practice, however, the postage expenses limited the extent of direct mail. The internet has made direct contact much less expensive.
Third, some parties have closed discussion forums for their members, where passwords are required. The Conservative Party organizers, for example, have given each member a user name and password -printed on the giro payment form for membership fees. 29 These closed forums are used for internal debates and training.
They may be especially useful for members of municipal councils. In the smaller parties, party groups in municipal councils are very small -often one or two persons.
They easily become isolated. Through the party's internal web system, they can get in touch with colleagues from other municipalities, and discuss common problems and solutions in different policy areas.
An informal version of thematic network may develop in this way. However, the distinction between such informal networks and factions may be vague. Organized opposition factions also utilize the internet. For example, a left-wing network within the Socialist Left Party had its own website and communicated by e-mail. describes the situation in this way:
Often, when I talk passionately about this, I get very harsh reactions. 'This is not the party we used to know. How about us, who have never touched a computer? Are you going to distribute all information on the web, so that wewho lack the skills -are cut off? No, we do not want that kind of party democracy.' This is a very real problem. Even though internet access becomes more widespread, the dilemma will not disappear for some time. Many people, especially in the older generation, are cut off from any internet participation. A sharp distinction, that threatens the egalitarian ideals of party democracy, may develop within the parties.
Accordingly, electronic communication is mainly used as a forum for discussion, not for decision-making.
Internal party newspapers
What happens The most immediate motivation appears to be changes in public subsidies to the parties' information activities. In 1999, subventions targeted at party publications were reduced and replaced with a general support for party information (Kristelig Folkeparti 2000:3-4) . However, Labour and Liberal party organizers also mentioned other arguments. 31 They wanted to communicate with all members, instead of the minority who subscribed to the newspaper. Members deserve information, in return for their membership fees. They also need information to function as ambassadors to the community. In addition, Labour's membership magazine was partly a response to the criticism against internet-based information. Printed information was needed, to reach members without access to the internet.
CONCLUSION: BETWEEN MASS PARTIES AND NETWORK

PARTIES?
Norwegian party organizers still regard some kind of membership party as their ideal. Many of Scarrow's (1996:40-50) arguments in favour of members were mentioned by Norwegian party organizers, though the weight of the different arguments may vary between parties. Party strategists value members as ambassadors to the community, as election campaigners, as policy developers, and as potential candidates for public office. Financial benefits were also mentioned, in spite of generous public subventions for parties. In terms of Katz's (1990) Is direct membership democracy something for us? ' (Forfang 1996) . In this article, he discussed the use of membership ballots by the German Social Democrats, the French
Socialists and the British Labour Party. The same issue also included an article on virtual party branches in the German Social Democratic Party (Olsson 1996) . Without closer case studies, however, it is difficult to distinguish 'contagion effects' from similar, but independent, solutions to similar problems.
In summary, external factors and imitation pull parties towards convergence, while party internal factors may cause divergence. As we have seen, party debates about organizational problems are quite similar. This points to convergence. On the other hand, the implementation of organizational cures is limited, and varies between parties. At this stage, we do not know whether the 'pioneers' will implement their visions, and whether the 'latecomers' will follow them or maintain the traditional model.
Why stability?
Although some innovations have been introduced, we find it equally important to explore the causes of the evident stability. One obvious explanation is organizational inertia. Old habits are difficult to change. Nonetheless, our discussions with party organizers have pointed to three additional -and perhaps more rationalcauses for stability. The administrative structure of the state constitutes an external source of stability. The internal factors concern the tension between, on the one hand, traditional concepts of intra-party democracy and, on the other hand, network structures and direct democracy.
First, the geographical branch structure is firmly rooted in the administrative structure of the Norwegian state. Parties are organizations that seek to elect officeholders at the national, county and municipal level. A network structure that crosscuts administrative structures might be less efficient for election campaigns.
Moreover, the administrative structure places legal constraints on the parties. The
Liberal Party wanted to merge some county branches into larger regional branches, but discovered that electoral law and public subsidies to parties often required correspondence between the party structure and the country's administrative structure. 32 In addition to the obvious interest in controlling local decision-making, it is worth mentioning that a municipality is more than an administrative unit; it is also a community. Many party members identify with their community, rather than some thematic field of interest. They regard the geographical party branch as a tool for participation in community politics -as well as an arena for face-to-face contact with fellow party members.
Second, the mass party structure has some democratic qualities. The responsibility for decisions is clearly defined, and the power of the leadership is restricted by a set of formal rules. Moreover, it is in principle an egalitarian structure;
all members have their say in party decisions via delegatory democracy. Of course, it does rarely work that way. Delegatory democracy easily turns into oligarchy. The point, however, is that a fluid and informal network structure may increase oligarchic tendencies. Personal connections may become even more crucial -at the expense of equal rights.
Third, the classic objections to direct democracy also apply to intra-party 
